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Building Support-based Opponent Models in
Persuasion Dialogues
Christos Hadjinikolis, Sanjay Modgil, and Elizabeth Black
King’s College London
name.surname@kcl.ac.uk
Abstract. This paper deals with an approach to opponent-modelling
in argumentation-based persuasion dialogues. It assumes that dialogue
participants (agents) have models of their opponents’ knowledge, which
can be augmented based on previous dialogues. Specifically, previous di-
alogues indicate relationships of support, which refer both to arguments
as abstract entities and to their logical constituents. The augmentation
of an opponent model relies on these relationships. An argument ex-
ternal to an opponent model can augment that model with its logical
constituents, if that argument shares support relationships with other
arguments that can be constructed from that model. The likelihood that
the constituents of supporting arguments will in fact be known to an
opponent, varies according to support types. We therefore provide cor-
responding quantifications for each support type.
1 Introduction
Strategy development in agent dialogues is an area that has received ample re-
search interest in the last years [2, 3, 8, 10, 15, 20–22]. Specifically, strategising in
a dialogue concerns the selection of a particular locution among all available lo-
cutions, which by some measure is deemed optimal [7]. In competitive contexts,
“optimal” is understood in terms of increasing a participant’s self-interested util-
ity. Since in such contexts the employed knowledge is usually distributed amongst
the participants, agents are unaware of the locutions available to their oppo-
nents. Thus, they often assume models of their opponents’ possible knowledge
for simulating how a dialogue may evolve, and develop strategies accordingly.
Building and updating an opponent model (OM) is a challenging task. As
Black and Hunter explain in [4], one needs to investigate how such models can
be maintained and under what circumstances they can be useful, and go on
to identify situations in which the use of particular model-update mechanisms
may be disadvantageous. Generally, a common assumption is that OMs can be
constructed on the basis of a participant’s accumulated dialogue experience [10,
15, 21]. Specifically in the context of argumentation-based persuasion dialogues,
some researchers propose that these models are augmented with external content
(arguments), assuming relationships between the latter and information already
in the model [10]. These relationships can be based on the notion of support.
In [10], Hadjinikolis et al. rely on the ASPIC+ framework for structured
argumentation to define a dialogue system for persuasion. In this system agents
are assumed to have models of their opponents’ knowledge. This knowledge
can be augmented based on a modeller’s dialogue history using the notion of
reinstatement support. For example, assume that two agents, Ag1 (modeller)
and Ag2 (opponent) engage in a dialogue. Let A be an argument introduced by
Ag2 in a dialogue, countered by Ag1 with argument B. If B is then countered by
Ag2 with a third argument C, we then assume a support relationship between
A (the supported) and C (the supporter), in the sense that C reinstates A.
Ag1 can model such relationships as directed, weighted arcs, linking nodes that
represent the associated arguments (e.g. A → C), in what is referred to as a
relationship graph (RG). An arc weight represents the frequency with which a
certain argument is followed by a supporter in dialogues in which the modeller
has participated, e.g. how often does C follow after A. Relying on this graph Ag1
can augment an existing OM of another agent (e.g. Ag3), to include the logical
constituents of supporters, assuming that the latter are related to arguments that
can be instantiated from the current state of that OM. For example, including in
an OM the constituents of argument C, given that A can already be instantiated
by that OM. Arc weights can then be used for the calculation of a probability
value assigned to these constituents, which represents the modeller’s confidence
that an opponent is indeed aware of them.
In addition to reinstatement, other kinds of relationships can be used to
identify support between arguments. For example, let an argument A be attacked
by two arguments B1 and B2. One may argue that B1 and B2 support each other
since they share the same attack target. Furthermore, more expressive kinds of
support can be identified between arguments if one inspects their structure.
For example, one may assume that an argument X supports an argument Y if
they share the same conclusion/claim. This could also be assumed if X’s claim
appears as a premise in Y or in the antecedent of a rule in Y .
The purpose of this paper is to extend the work in [10] in the following ways.
Firstly, it extends the notion of a RG by including a new kind of support rela-
tionship, concerned with arguments which attack the same target, allowing for
another modelling alternative. Secondly, by inspecting the structure of related
arguments, a refined categorisation of different support types is proposed, ac-
cording to which support relationships are distinguished between low-level logical
relationships and high-level abstract relationships. The first are special instances
of the latter. It is then argued that in addition to abstract relationships, logical
ones suggest a stronger connection between related arguments, which can be
interpreted as an increased likelihood of them being mutually known to a cer-
tain opponent. Finally, a more fine grained quantification of these likelihoods is
proposed, which reflects the properties of the support relationships they concern.
The paper is organised as follows. Sections 2.1 & 2.2 respectively present
the ASPIC+ framework for structured argumentation [13], and the ASPIC+-
based dialogue framework for persuasion presented in [9]. Using a framework
for structured argumentation is necessary for investigating both abstract as well
as logical support relationships between arguments. ASPIC+ is chosen as a
general and expressive framework, which accommodates many existing logical
approaches to argumentation [13], allowing us to claim an analogous generality
for our research. Section 3 elaborates on the categorisation of different support
relationships between arguments, and on how they are modelled as weighted
directed arcs between nodes of arguments in a RG. Section 4 shows how these
weights are quantified in a way that reflects the relationships they concern.
Finally, Section 5 discusses our work in relation to how the notion of support
is generally used in the literature, while Section 6 summarises our contributions
and presents future work.
2 Background
2.1 ASPIC+
ASPIC+ [13] instantiates Dung’s [6] abstract approach by assuming an unspec-
ified logical language L, and by defining arguments as inference trees formed by
applying strict or defeasible inference rules of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ϕ and
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ϕ, interpreted as ‘if the antecedents ϕ1, . . . , ϕn hold, then without
exception, respectively presumably, the consequent ϕ holds’.
To define attacks, minimal assumptions on L are made; namely that certain
wff (well formed formulæ) are a contrary or contradictory of certain other wff.
Apart from this the framework is still abstract: it applies to any set of strict and
defeasible inference rules, and to any logical language with a defined contrary
relation. The basic notion of ASPIC+ is an argumentation system.
Definition 1. Let AS = (L,−,R,≤) be an argumentation system where:
– L is a logical language.
– − is a contrariness function from L to 2L, such that:
• ϕ is a contrary of ψ if ϕ ∈ ψ and ψ 6∈ ϕ;
• ϕ is a contradictory of ψ (denoted by ‘ϕ=−ψ’), if ϕ∈ψ and ψ∈ϕ.
– R = Rs ∪Rd is a set of strict (Rs) and defeasible (Rd) inference rules such
that Rs ∩Rd = ∅.
– ≤ is a pre-ordering on Rd.
Arguments are then constructed with respect to a knowledge base that is as-
sumed to contain two kinds of formulæ.
Definition 2. A knowledge base (KB) in an AS is a pair (K,≤′) where
K ⊆ L and K = Kn ∪ Kp where these subsets of K are disjoint: Kn is the
(necessary) axioms (which cannot be attacked); and Kp is the ordinary premises
(on which attacks succeed contingent upon preferences), and where ≤′ is a pre-
ordering on the ordinary premises Kp.
Arguments are now defined, where for any argument A, Prem returns all
the formulas of K (premises) used to build A; Conc returns A’s conclusion; Sub
returns all of A’s sub-arguments; and Rules returns all rules in A.
Definition 3. An argument A on the basis of a knowledge base (K,≤′) in an
argumentation system (L,−,R,≤) is:
1. ϕ if ϕ ∈ K with: Prem(A)={ϕ}; Conc(A)=ϕ; Sub(A)={ϕ}; Rules(A) = ∅.
2. A1, . . . An →/⇒ ψ if A1, . . . , An are arguments such that there exists a
strict/defeasible rule Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)→/⇒ ψ in Rs/Rd.
Prem(A) = Prem(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Prem(An); Conc(A) = ψ;
Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A};
Rules(A) = Rules(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Rules(An)∪
{Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)→/⇒ ψ}
Three kinds of attack are defined for ASPIC+ arguments. B can attack A by
attacking a premise or conclusion of A, or an inference step in A. For the latter
undercutting attacks, it is assumed that applications of inference rules can be
expressed in the object language; the precise nature of this naming convention
will be left implicit.
Definition 4. A attacks B iff A undercuts, rebuts or undermines B, where:
– A undercuts argument B (on B′) iff Conc(A) ∈ B′ for some B′ ∈ Sub(B)
of the form B′′1 , . . . , B
′′
n ⇒ ψ.
– A rebuts argument B (on B′) iff Conc(A) ∈ ϕ for some B′ ∈ Sub(B) of
the form B′′1 , . . . , B
′′
n ⇒ ϕ. In such a case A contrary-rebuts B iff Conc(A)
is a contrary of ϕ.
– A undermines B (on B′) iff Conc(A) ∈ ϕ for some B′ = ϕ, ϕ ∈ Prem(B)\
Kn. In such a case A contrary-undermines B iff Conc(A) is a contrary of ϕ.
An undercut, contrary-rebut, or contrary-undermine attack is said to be preference-
independent, otherwise an attack is preference-dependent.
Then, A defeats B (denotedA → B) iff A attacks B (denoted A ⇀ B) on
B′, and either: A ⇀ B is preference-independent, or; A ⇀ B is preference-
dependent and A⊀B′.
Some kinds of attack succeed as defeats independently of preferences over
arguments, whereas others succeed only if the attacked argument is not stronger
than the attacking argument. The orderings on defeasible rules and non-axiom
premises are assumed to be used in defining an ordering  on the constructed
arguments. Unlike [13] a function p is explicitly defined in [9], that takes as
input a KB in an AS (and so the defined arguments and orderings on rules and
premises) and returns  (see [13] for ways in which such a function would define
). Finally, ≺ is assumed to be the strict counerpart of . The combination
of an argumentation system, a knowledge base and a function p, is called an
argumentation theory.
Definition 5. An argumentation theory is a triple AT = (AS,KB, p) where
AS is an argumentation system, KB is a knowledge base in AS and:
p : AS ×KB −→
such that  is an ordering on the set of all arguments that can be constructed
from KB in AS.
2.2 The Dialogue Framework
In [9], Hadjinikolis et al. assume an environment of multiple agents Ag1, . . . , Agν ,
where each Agi can engage in persuasion dialogues in which its strategic selec-
tion of locutions may be based on what Agi believes its interlocutor (in the set
Agj 6=i) believes. Each Agi maintains a model of its possible opponent agents
that represents the logical information possible opponents may use to construct
arguments and preferences, rather than just abstract arguments and their rela-
tions. All agents share the same contrary relation −, the same language L, and
the same way of defining preferences over arguments based on the pre-orderings
over non-axiom premises and defeasible rules (i.e., the same function p).
Definition 6. Let {Ag1, . . . , Agν} be a set of agents. For i = 1 . . . ν, the agent
theory of Agi is a tuple:
AgTi =< S(i,1), . . . , S(i,ν) >
where for j = 1 . . . ν, each sub-theory S(i,j) is what Agi believes is the argumen-
tation theory (AS(i,j),KB(i,j), p(i,j)) of Agj, and:
– if j = i, S(i,j) is Agi’s own argumentation theory.
– for any i, j, k,m ∈ {1 . . . ν}, it holds that:
S(i,j) = (AS(i,j),KB(i,j), p(i,j)) and S(k,m) = (AS(k,m),KB(k,m), p(k,m))
be any two distinct sub-theories, then:
p(i,j) = p(k,m), L(i,j) = L(k,m) and −(i, j) = −(k,m).
1 2 3 4
K ≤′ R ≤
1 S(i,1) K(i,1) ≤′(i,1) R(i,1) ≤(i,1)
2 S(i,2) K(i,2) ≤′(i,2) R(i,2) ≤(i,2)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i S(i,i) K(i,i) ≤′(i,i) R(i,i) ≤(i,i)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ν S(i,ν) K(i,ν) ≤′(i,ν) R(i,ν) ≤(i,ν)
Table 1. The discrete sets of logical elements found in each sub-theory of Agi’s agent
theory (AgTi).
A simplified version of an agent’s AgT appears in Table 1. Essentially, the notion
of an OM is captured by a sub-theory. For convenience, a simplified version of a
sub-theory is assumed, of the form:
S(i,j) = {K(i,j),≤′(i,j),R(i,j),≤(i,j)}
which contains the discrete sets of logical elements assumed by the modeller (in
this case Agi) to be known by each of its opponents (Agj 6=i), including the mod-
eller’s own sub-theory (S(i,i)). Henceforth, we may omit subscripts identifying
pre-orderings and rules specific to a given agent.
Dialogue participants are assumed to introduce arguments constructed in a
common language L, which attack those of their opponent, sharing an under-
standing of when one argument attacks another, based on the language depen-
dent notion of conflict. Preferences may also be submitted in the dialogue against
arguments, as a means of invalidating the success of an attack as defeat. Commit-
ment stores are employed, to store the preferences and the logical constituents of
the arguments introduced by each agent in a dialogue. These commitment stores
are then used by the dialogue participants for directly updating the sub-theories
(OMs) of their respective opponents, e.g. Agi can use the commitment store of
its opponent Agj in a dialogue to update the contents of its sub-theory S(i,j).
Participants assume the roles of proponent (Pr) and opponent (Op), where
the former submits an initial argument X, whose claim is the topic of the dia-
logue. The set of arguments A instantiated by the logical constituents submitted
by both parties during the course of a dialogue, are assumed to be organised into
a Dung framework, AF = (A,D), where D is the binary defeat relation on A,
i.e. D ⊆ A × A, defined on the basis of the attack relationships between the
arguments, and the preferences introduced into the dialogue by both partici-
pants. Two sets of protocol rules are described: one for the grounded and one for
the preferred semantics. These rules regulate turn-taking and the legal moves
available to the participants in a dialogue, in a way that reflects their respective
semantics. Conflicting preferences are resolved in favour of Op in the grounded
case, and of Pr in the preferred1.
Since the modelling of an opponent’s preferences is not in the scope of this
work, we only assume dialogue moves whose content is just arguments and leave
the modelling of preferences to future work. Furthermore, since our interest is
just to model opponent arguments in terms of how they appear in dialogues,
rather than distinguishing between different dialogues with respect to different
semantics (e.g. grounded, preferred), we define a general dialogue with minimal
restrictions on the moves available to each participant at each point.
We define a dialogue D as a sequence of dialogue moves < DM0, . . . ,DMn >
of the form DM =< I,A >, where I ∈ {Pr,Op}, I = Pr if I = Op and vice-
versa, and A is an argument in the set AI instantiated from I’s sub-theory
(S(I,I)) as well as from the commitment store of a participant’s opponent. The
content of DM0 is the initial argument for the topic of the dialogue. The legality
of a dialogue move is regulated by explicit rules that, among others, account for
the dialogical objective and a participant’s role. For the purpose of this paper
these are defined as follows:
Definition 7. D =< DM0, . . . ,DMn > is a legal persuasion dialogue if:
1 Note that if agents play logically perfectly they can be shown to win iff the argument
they move is justified under the grounded respectively preferred semantics in the
framework constructed during the dialogue [9].
1. DM0 =< Pr,X > (the dialogue begins with Pr’s move);
2. for i = 0 . . . n − 1, if DMi =< I,A ∈ AI > then DMi+1 =< I,B ∈ AI >
(Pr and Op take turns);
3. for i = 1 . . . n, each DMi is a reply to some DMj, j < i (alternative replies
are allowed), where DMj =< I,A >, DMi =< I,B > and B attacks A.
Since we assume multi-reply protocols which allow participants to backtrack and
reply to previous opponent moves, dialogues can be represented as trees rather
than sequences of moves. An example is shown in Fig.1a, where Ag1’s moves
DM5 & DM7 are used as alternative replies against Ag2’s move DM1.:
Definition 8. Let D =< DM0, . . . ,DMn > be a dialogue andM = {DM0, . . . ,
DMn} the set of moves in D . Then T = {M, E} is a dialogue tree with root
node DM0, and arcs E ⊆M×M, such that for every two moves DMi & DMj,
(DMi,DMj)∈E means that DMj is DMi’s target (DMi replies to DMj).
Every move inM that is not the target of another move is a leaf-node, while each
distinct path from DM0 to a leaf node is a dispute. For a T with m leaf-nodes,
∆ = {d1, . . . , dm} is the set of all disputes in T . Each new dispute results from
a backtracking move by either of the participants. Note that for convenience we
may represent a dialogue tree as T = {d1, . . . , dm}.
Provided a modeller’s history of dialogues, Hadjinikolis et al. [10] model sup-
port relationships between arguments in these dialogues, in the form of a rela-
tionship graph (RG). A RG is assumed to be incrementally constructed through
a series of dialogues. It is composed of nodes which represent the set of all en-
countered opponent arguments (OAs) in a modeller’s dialogue history, linked
with directed, weighted arcs that represent support relationships between them.
Definition 9. Let H = {D1, . . . , Dk} be an agent’s history of dialogues and
AH represent the set of arguments introduced by that agent’s opponents in H.
Then a relationship graph (RG) is a directed graph RG = {AH, R}, where
R ⊆ AH × AH is a set of weighted arcs representing support relationships. For
two arguments A,B ∈ AH, we write rAB to denote the arc (A,B) ∈ R, and
denote the arc’s weight as wAB where 0 ≤ wAB ≤ 1.
Note that arc weights are actually probability values. Thus, henceforth we may
write Pr(rAB) referring to rAB ’s weight wAB , i.e. Pr(rAB) = wAB .
Finally, the augmentation process proposed in [10] consists of three steps.
Let Ag1 and Ag2 be two agents about to engage in a dialogue. Let Ag1 have
a model of Ag2’s possible knowledge S(1,2) and let RG1 be Ag1’s relationship
graph. First, instantiate a set A with all arguments that can be constructed from
S(1,2). Second, identify a set NA with arguments adjacent to A in RG1, where
every X ∈ NA is a supporter of some Y ∈ A. Third, based on the arc weights
on the support relationships between A and NA compute and assign confidence
values to the constituents of the arguments in NA, and augment S(1,2) with them.
3 Modelling Support Relationships
The modelling approach proposed in [10] assumes that if two arguments share a
support relationship in aRG, then if the supported in the relationship is assumed
to be already known to a certain opponent, it is likely that the supporter is also
known to that opponent. In contrast to [10] we assume more than just one
type of support between arguments. This section presents four types of support,
distinguishing them according to whether they are abstract or logical.
3.1 Abstract Support Relationships
Abstract support relationships are concerned with how opponent arguments ap-
pear in a dialogue structure. The first kind of support relationship we discuss is
that of reinstatement support (RS). Though not explicitly referred as such, this
is the relationship on which the work in [10] relies on. The RS of an argument
A (supported) by an argument B (supporter) is represented if B defends A as
defined in [6]. An example of a RS identified in the dialogue tree of Fig.1a is the
one between arguments A and C in the sense that C reinstates A by attacking
A’s attacker B. Other such relationships are those between A and G, A and I,
and C and E, for which corresponding arcs are instantiated to construct the
RS-RG of Fig.1b (where we assume Ag2 is the modeller). The identification of
these relationships as well as their representation in an RG, is defined as follows.
Definition 10. Let RG={AH, R} be a relationship graph andRS⊆R be a subset
of R representing all of the RS relationships. Let A and B be any two argu-
ments respectively serving as the content of two opponent dialogue movesDMi∈
dk and DMj ∈ dl in a dialogue tree T = {d1, . . . , dm}. Let level() be a function
applied on a DM that returns the level of the move in T . Then ∃rAB ∈ RS if:
1. k = l (the two moves are in the same dispute);
2. i < j (DMi precedes DMj in the dialogue);
3. level(DMj)− level(DMi) = 2.
In this paper we now introduce the additional notion of a common attack tar-
get support (CATS) relationship. Intuitively, arguments which attack the same
target support each other in the sense that they serve the same objective; to
invalidate that target. An example of a CATS identified in the dialogue tree of
Fig.1a is the one between arguments C and G, in the sense that they both attack
the same target (argument B). Notice that in contrast to RS relationships, each
argument in a CATS relationship supports the other. Hence, arcs between these
arguments are reciprocal.
Referring to Fig.1a, CATS relationships exist between G and I, and C and I;
hence the corresponding arcs in the CATS-RG of Fig.1c. In general, arguments
are linked in a RG if they appear in distinct disputes in the same dialogue, in
reply to the same modeller argument, i.e. attacking the same target in a dialogue.
We formally express this as follows.
Fig. 1. a) A T between Ag1(grey) & Ag2, b) a RS-RG, c) a CATS-RG, d) the jointRG.
Definition 11. Let RG= {AH, R} be a relationships graph. Let d′ be a sub-
dispute of a dispute d ∈ T such that d′ =< DM0, . . . ,DMk >, and A and B
be two arguments respectively serving as the content of two opponent dialogue
moves DMi and DMj in a dialogue tree T . Then ∃rAB , rBA ∈ CATS ⊆ R, if
both DMi and DMj extend d′ in T , and:
– ∃d′1 =< DM0, . . . ,DMk,DMi >, where d′1 is a sub-dispute of a d1 ∈ T , and;
– ∃d′2 =< DM0, . . . ,DMk,DMj >, where d′2 is a sub-dispute of a d2 ∈ T .
Note that the reader might well assume the transitive closure of arcs in an
RG, so that, for example, the existence of arcs rCI and rIC might be inferred
given the existence of arcs rCG & rGI (which infer rCI) and rIG & rGC (which
infer rIC) (see Fig. 1). This can assist in reducing the explicit representation of
arcs between all nodes that attack the same argument. However, as Definition 11
states, it is imperative that arguments are linked with CATS relationships only
if they appear in the same dialogue tree, attacking the same argument. Take for
instance a case where, arguments C and G appear in the same dialogue attacking
the same argument, B, while G and I appear in another dialogue attacking
B again. In this case, simply relying on transitivity to assume a support link
between C and I seems unreasonable, since the two attackers have never jointly
appeared in the same dialogue attacking the same argument.
This is not to say that assuming a transitivity property is wrong or even
counter-intuitive. It does make sense to assume that arguments which distinctly
attack the same target may appear together in a future dialogue (or that, equiv-
alently, may be mutually known to a certain opponent). However, the modelling
perspective that this paper adopts requires that all linked arguments in a RG
jointly appear in dialogues, as this bears on the likelihood that a certain argu-
ment will follow after a certain other.
3.2 Logical Support Relationships
We now turn to logical support relationships. As will be shown, they are in fact
special instances of abstract support relationships and will therefore only affect
the quantification of the weights assigned to the arcs they concern, i.e. no new
arcs will be defined by identified logical supports. Note that we will motivate
the need of using logical support relationships in Section 4, where we discuss the
expectations implied by these relationships and how they positively affect the
weighting of the arcs they concern.
In order to investigate logical relationships between arguments we turn to
their structure. We exemplify by reference to an argumentation system AS =
(L,−,R,≤), where:
– L is a language of propositional literals, composed from a set of propositional
atoms {a, b, c, . . . } and the symbols ¬ and∼ respectively denoting strong and
weak negation (i.e., negation as failure);
– α is a strong literal if α is a propositional atom or of the form ¬β where β
is a propositional atom;
– α is a wff of L if α is a strong literal or of the form ∼ β where β is a strong
literal, and;
– for a wff α, α and ¬α are contradictories and α is a contrary of ∼ α.
Assume then a dialogue between two agents (Ag1 and Ag2) with structured
arguments, as it appears in Fig.2a.
Fig. 2. a) A dialogue between Ag1(grey) and Ag2, b) the RGs constructed by Ag1 for
Ag2’s arguments, and c) the RGs constructed by Ag2 for Ag1’s arguments.
The first logical relationship we identify is backbone support (BBS). The BBS
concerns relationships where the supporter’s claim is a formula in the antecedent
of a rule in another (supported) argument, in response to a challenge (attack)
on that formula (as described in [12]). For instance, take the RS relationship
rAC1 (Fig.2b). Notice in Fig.2a that C1’s claim p is in the antecedent of rule
p, s ⇒ q in A, which means that C1 serves as a BBS for A, in response to
the B1’s attack on p. Note that strictly speaking, B1 attacks the premise p in
A1, and in principle BBS support can of course respond to an attack on the
conclusion of a defeasible rule (rather than a premise) that supplies the formula
in the antecedent of the rule in the supported argument. However, we focus
on the formula in the antecedent, to accommodate extensions of our dialogue
framework that allow the use of enthymemes as modelled in ASPIC+ [11]; e.g.,
when A1 is simply moved as the rule p, s ⇒ q, and the supporting argument
effectively backward extends A1 [18] in response to the challenge. Finally, notice
that though rAC2 is a RS relationship, it cannot be characterised as BBS.
The second kind of logical relationship is that of common conclusion support
(CCS). CCS bears on a participant’s ability to support a certain claim in multiple
ways. An example of a CCS can be identified in Fig.2a between arguments B2
and B3 since they share the same claim ¬q. Notice again that while rB1B2 , rB2B1 ,
rB1B3 , rB3B1 , and rB2B3 , rB3B2 concern CATS relationships, only the last two
additionally concern CCS relationships.
At this point we must clarify that it is not the case that just CATS can also
be CCS relationships or that just RS relationships can be BBS relationships.
Take for example the CATS relationship rB1B3 (Fig.2c). Notice that B1 serves
as a BBS for argument B3 (Fig.2a). Further notice that rAE (Fig.2b) is a RS
which is also a CCS (Fig.2a). These relationships are formally defined as follows.
Definition 12. LetRG={AH, R} be a relationship graph whereR = RS∪CATS.
Let A and B be two arguments in AH and rAB ∈ R. Then BBS ⊆ R is a subset
of R representing all backbone support relationships, and CCS ⊆ R is a sub-
set of R representing all common conclusion support relationships, where if:
– Conc(A) = φ, and φ is in the antecedent of a rule in B, then rAB ∈ BBS;
– Conc(A) = Conc(B) = φ, then rAB ∈ CCS.
Lastly, we stress once more that logical relationships are simply special instances
of abstract relationships. As will be argued in the next section, they imply a
stronger connection between the associated arguments, and consequently an in-
creased likelihood that the modelled opponent is aware of the supporter.
4 Quantification of Support Relationships
All arcs in a RG assume assignment of numerical weight values. These values
express likelihoods, in the form of probability values, that a supporter argument
can be constructed by the modelled opponent, contingent on the latter being
aware of the supported argument. Weight assignation depends on the abstract
as well as on the logical support type of a relationship. Thus, we assume that arc
weights (w) are produced from two distinct sub-weights; one abstract wα, and
one logical wλ. We propose that logical weights should have a positive impact
on the overall weight of an arc, given that we interpret abstract and logical
weights as probability values concerned with the same random event; that of the
supporter in a relationship being known to an opponent, contingent on knowledge
of the supported. We therefore define the weight of an arc to be equal to the
joint probability value of its two sub-weights. All weight values are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.).
Definition 13. Let H be a modeller’s history of dialogues, A and B two argu-
ments of a RG= {AH, R} induced from H, and rAB ∈ R with a weight wAB,
where wαAB and w
λ
AB are respectively the abstract and logical sub-weights
of wAB. Then:
wAB = w
α
AB + w
λ
AB − wαAB · wλAB .
Different support types are quantified differently, and encode expectations
regarding the awareness of the supporting arguments. For example, RS rela-
tionships imply that supporter opponent arguments are likely to follow after
supported arguments in dialogues, as responses to challenges. The extent of that
likelihood is defined by the frequency that this is shown to happen between two
arguments, in a modeller’s history of dialogues.
Assume, for example, that a modeller, Ag1, monitors an opponent argument
A, introduced by various opponents in a series of dialogues. Let A appear a
total of 10 times in these dialogues, and is attacked by arguments introduced
by Ag1. Assume then that A is reinstated against those arguments by opponent
arguments B, C and D, respectively 3, 4 and 1 times, while in two dialogues A
is not reinstated by any argument. Then the abstract weights wαAB , w
α
AC and
wαAD for the respective RS relationships rAB , rAC and rAD will be
3
10 ,
4
10 and
1
10 .
These weights represent how likely the supporting argument (e.g. B in rAB) will
be submitted by any given opponent, so as to reinstate the supported argument
(e.g. A). This is the approach proposed in [10].
We produce an analogous ratio for the case of CATS, which represents how
likely a modeller’s argument will be attacked by a given pair of opponent ar-
guments. As with RS relationships, CATS implies that supporting opponent
arguments are likely to follow after supported arguments, as alternative attacks
(replies). Again, this likelihood is defined by the frequency that this is shown to
happen in a modeller’s history of dialogues.
For example, suppose a modeller’s argument A introduced in three dialogues
with different agents, where Ag1 monitors attacks on A. Assume that in the first
dialogue A is attacked by opponent arguments B, C and D, in the second by
B and C and in the third by B and D. One may then assume the following
relationships: rBC , rBD, rCB , rCD,rDC and rDB . The weight for each of these
relationships will be the number of times the arguments in each relationship
appear jointly, divided by the number of times that the supported argument
in the relationship appeared in distinct disputes attacking the common target.
For example, C follows B two out of the three times that B attacks A, thus
wBC =
2
3 , while B follows C every time that C attacks A, wCB =
2
2 . Hence,
wBD =
1
3 , rCD =
1
2 ,wDC =
1
2 and wDB =
2
2 . Definition 14 formally describes
these quantifications.
Definition 14. Let H be a modeller’s history of dialogues and RG= {AH, R}
the relationship graph induced from H, where R = RS ∪ CATS are respectively
the sets of reinstatement and common attack target support. Let rAB ∈ R with
a weight wAB, where w
α
AB is the abstract sub-weight of wAB. Also let:
(a) occurrencesRS(H, A,B) = CAB ,
(b) instancesRS(H, A) = IA,
(c) occurrencesCATS(H, A,B,C) = JAB ,
(d) instancesCATS(H, A,C) = IAC ,
be respectively:
(a) a function that returns the number of times B follows after A in distinct
disputes in H,
(b) a function that returns the number of times A appeared in distinct disputes
in H though not as a leaf,
(c) a function that returns the number of joint appearances of A and B against
an argument C in the same dialogues in H,
(d) a function that returns the number of appearances of A against an argument
C in all dialogue of H.
Then:
wαAB =
{
CAB
IA
if rAB ∈ RS,
JAB
IAC
if rAB ∈ CATS.
Let us turn now to the quantification of logical relationships. As stated ear-
lier, we assume that logical relationships imply a stronger connection between
arguments that already share abstract relationships. Our intuitive expectation
of this strengthening rests on two assumptions. The first is that generally, if one
perceives argumentation as a way of characterising the reasoning one uses to
arrive at certain beliefs about the world, it is then reasonable to expect that
rational agents would ideally have explored all possible lines of reasoning with
respect to a claim. Hence, if an agent makes use of a (sub)argument claiming
p, then there is some likelihood that the agent will be aware of other argu-
ments concluding p. Secondly, in real-world dialogues agents move incomplete
arguments (enthymemes) in a dialogue (recall our discussion in Section 3.2), so
that challenges on a formula in the antecedent of a rule, motivates submission
of a supporting argument claiming that formula (and so effectively backward
extending the incomplete argument).
Based on these two assumptions we expect that participants are likely to be
aware of multiple ways of arguing for a claim, having been faced with responding
to challenges on the claim, as well as having had to respond to challenges on
a formula in order to argue why that formula is believed. These expectations
are justified by the existence of logical support relationships between some argu-
ments. Take for instance the case of the BBS relationship rAC1 (Fig.2b). Here
the introduction of C1 : g; g ⇒ p is caused by a challenge on A : p; s; p, s ⇒ q
that forces Ag1 to reveal an alternative line of reasoning justifying p (in A p is
already present as a premise), and hence an alternative line of reasoning justify-
ing q (i.e. g; g ⇒ p; s; p, s ⇒ q). On the other hand, if the incomplete argument
A′ : s; p, s⇒ q had been allowed, then the supporting C1 would have backward
extended A′ to yield g; g ⇒ p; s; p, s⇒ q. Similarly, the CCS relationship rB2,B3
(Fig.2c) suggests that Ag2 has explored other alternatives for ¬q, which were
revealed in the course of the dialogue, only when it became necessary.
Finally, there are many ways for quantifying the logical weights of an arc
rAB . One could focus on the supported argument in the relationship and using
all the OMs available to a modeller, produce a ratio by counting the number of
opponents that are aware of (can construct) logical supporters of A. Then, divide
that number with the number of opponents that are aware of any supporters of
A. This quantification approach focusses on the distinction between logical and
abstract relationships.
Fig. 3. An instance of a RG that focuses on the support relationships on argument A.
Take for instance argument A in Fig. 3 which appears to be supported by
four arguments, B,C,D and E. Let us assume that out of these four supporters
only B and D are logical supporters of A. Suppose that the modeller is operating
in a multi-agent environment with a total of 20 agents (excluding the modeller).
Let us further assume that out of those 20 agents, 10 can support A with at
least one of the supporters, and that of those 10 only 4 are aware of either B
either D or of both. This would yield a logical weight value both for rAB and
for rAD equal to
4
10 , i.e.:
wλAB = w
λ
AD =
4
10
.
Though in this case it may seem unreasonable that all logical relationships where
A is the supported argument will have the same logical weight, this approach
captures the intuition that if an argument A is logically supported by an oppo-
nent, then it is likely that that opponent will be aware of more logical supporters
of A. That likelihood is depended on the number of logical supporters an argu-
ment has, and therefore the logical weight of an arc is quantified with respect to
those supporters.
Other quantification perspectives with different objectives could focus on
other aspects of these relationships, e.g. to further distinguish between BBS and
CCS relationships. We therefore assume no absolute stance as to the exact way
of quantifying logical support relationships and define a general logical weighting
function as follows.
Definition 15. Let AgT be an agent’s agent theory containing all the sub-
theories of its opponents, and RG= {AH, R} a relationship graph where BBS,
CCS ⊆ R are respectively the sets of backbone and common conclusion support
arcs in R. Let rAB ∈ {CCS,BBS} with a weight wAB. Then:
weightL(RG, rAB , AgT )→ wλAB
is a function that returns wAB’s logical sub-weight w
λ
AB, where 0 ≤ wλAB ≤ 1.
5 Related Work
The notion of support is multifaceted and is concerned with positive interactions
between arguments [17]. Many types of support relationships have been identified
in the literature so far with different applications [5, 14, 16]. The most common
type is that of reinstatement which is implicit in Dung’s framework [6], and is
understood in the sense of counter-attack. However, as Amgoud et al. argue [1],
support does not use the same method as attack and thus counter-attack cannot
capture the notion of support completely.
In this respect, different perceptions of the notion have been formalised in the
literature, giving rise to a class of acceptability semantics defined within bipolar
argumentation framework (BAF), in which interactions between arguments con-
cern both attack as well as support relationships. For example, Boella et al. [5]
distinguish between what they refer to as deductive support, according to which
an argument A supports an argument B if the acceptance of A implies the ac-
ceptance of B, and defeasible support where the previous implication holds only
by default and it can be attacked. Similarly, Nouioua [14] assumes a perception
of support referred to as necessary support, according to which if an argument
A necessarily supports B, then acceptance of A is required for the acceptance of
B. Also, Oren and Norman [16] introduce the idea of evidential support, distin-
guishing “special” arguments which serve as prima-facie or indisputable sources
of truth, and “standard” arguments whose claims are not sufficiently justified,
and need to be supported by the former so as to be considered acceptable. Fi-
nally, accrual of arguments for the same claim [19] can also be interpreted as
support, where the accruing arguments mutually support each other.
Many of the above notions of support are motivated by logical relationships
between the constituents of support-related arguments, such as those introduced
in this paper. For example, in a similar sense to evidential support, BBS concerns
relationships where the supporter is called to justify the antecedent of another
argument (the supported), when the latter (which can be considered a standard
argument) is challenged. In our case though, the supporter is not required to
be a “special” argument. A case of deductive support can also be exemplified
through BBS. Assume an argument B : p; p→ q where p is an ordinary premise
and p → q a strict rule which cannot be attacked. Assume then an argument
A : s; s ⇒ p which backbone-supports B. Since p → q cannot be attacked,
acceptance of A should imply the acceptance of B. This is because any attack
on B’s premise p must also be by definition an attack on A’s claim. Similarly,
in the case of necessary support, one could say that A necessarily supports B.
Also, CCS effectively models the accrual of mutually supporting arguments for
the same claim.
Finally, we have considered extensions to our dialogical framework which al-
low for use of enthymemes, e.g., A′ : s; p, s ⇒ q supported by C1 : g; g ⇒ p;.
As argued by Modgil [12], logical instantiations of frameworks by given sets
of formulae do not (for the purposes of argumentation-based inference where
the claims of justified arguments identify the inferences from the instantiating
formulae) warrant abstract representations of support relations in frameworks.
Rather, support relations are useful in other settings, including dialogues. For
example when incomplete arguments are moved (e.g., A′), and the missing el-
ements are subsequently supported (e.g., with C1). If one were to start with a
set of formulae {g; g ⇒ p; s; p, s ⇒ q}, it would suffice to simply construct the
argument g; g ⇒ p; s; p, s ⇒ q. In a dialogue, the latter is implicitly, and in-
crementally, constructed through moving A′ and (in response to the challenge)
the supporting C1. In these contexts, the use of such supporting relationships as
well as relationships such as CATS, provide further value for opponent modelling
purposes and for OM augmentation.
6 Conclusions & Future Work
This paper extended the work of Hadjinikolis et al. [10] in the following ways.
Firstly, it extended the notion of a RG by introducing CATSs relationships
between arguments, which is to the best of our knowledge a novel notion of
support presented here, allowing for more modelling alternatives. Secondly, it
proposed a distinction between abstract support relationships concerned with
how arguments appear in the structure of dialogues, and logical relationships,
concerned with relationships between the constituents of arguments already ab-
stractly related. It then argued that (as in [12]) these relationships are redundant
when considering logical instantiations for argumentation-based inference, but
are needed in dialogical contexts, providing further value for opponent modelling
purposes. Lastly, corresponding quantifications of the likelihoods implied by the
presented support relationships were proposed.
We should clarify that the proposed modelling mechanism is not to be used
for building an OM through its sole use, but rather to be jointly used with other
mechanisms to augment an existing OM. Such mechanisms may concern: direct
collection [10], where the constituents of arguments asserted in a dialogue by
an opponent are directly added to its OM; the use of virtual arguments [20],
based on which meta-levels of an OM are assumed, which contain arguments
possibly known to an opponent that the modeller itself is not aware of, and;
the employment of mechanisms concerned with removing data from an OM
that are inconsistent with an opponent’s behaviour [3]. Combined use of these
mechanisms, rather than just the use of the one proposed in this paper, lim-
its the possibility that a constructed OM will concern a system of supportive
arguments of one’s opponent, rather than a general representation of that oppo-
nent’s knowledge—since OMs will be built and updated based on more than just
support relationships. Support is only used as a reasonable basis for inferring
likelihoods that certain arguments, currently not members of an OM, could be
known to a modelled opponent and should thus be included in its OM.
Future research will focus on the development of a methodology towards
evaluating our modelling approach and validating our assumptions on the in-
creased likelihoods implied by logical support relationships between arguments.
Finally, we also intend to extend our work by including “why” locutions, which
are expected to make logical relationships more evident.
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